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The executive retains power through the intentional ambiguity of the “war” metaphor – the “war on terror” identifies no definitive enemy but instead provides the president the authority to characterize it as a metaphorical “war of ideas” or a struggle against “extremism” – the figurative becomes the literal as the perceived reality of conditions of war support the need for the “war” metaphor – the resulting confusion between contingent definitions of war and policies’ justification of force against indistinct enemies makes war powers expansion inevitable.

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The U.S. war on terrorism, as it was being constructed during the George W. Bush administration, differed from the other wars that we have considered in some obvious and significant respects. Most fundamentally, while those were initiated in response to a perceived evil found within the body of the nation, the war on terrorism took as its primary target already-organized foreign groups, and centrally an organization that had itself identified as an enemy of the United States. With respect to these groups, the war on terrorism did not, then, need to play the same role in constructing the state or the enemy. Yet the representation of the enemy was never limited to these groups; and the Bush administration and its congressional allies not only claimed a much broader scope for the war overseas but also sought to open up as well a domestic front in that war, expansively conceived. In doing so, it extended yet further that tendency that we noted in the war on crime and drugs: toward modeling certain areas of criminal law on a war between the true body politic and its domestic enemies. It is this internalization of the war of terrorism with which I shall be concerned here. After the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration attempted to obtain from Congress a resolution giving the President expansive authority to “deter and pre-empt future acts of terrorism.”54 Although the Authorization for the Use of Military Force that Congress (AUMF) adopted restricted the use of force to those who had “planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” of 9/11 or “harbored such organizations or persons,”55 the administration promptly recharacterized it as a declaration of an abstract “war on terror.” In his statement accompanying the signing of the resolution, for example, President Bush described the enemy in broad terms: as the “scourge of terrorism directed against the United States and its interests.”56 And in his Military Order two months later, which relied for its authority in part on the AUMF, the President established a system of military tribunals for the “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism”57 with broad authority to detain and try any noncitizen whom the President determined it would be “in the interest of the United States . . . [to make] subject to this order.” From the beginning, the administration’s representation of the war was somewhat ambiguous with respect to whether it was metaphorical or literal. Literally, of course, (as has been pointed out commonly enough) one cannot declare war against a tactic. Moreover, the Bush administration would at times find it advantageous, particularly in seeking to expand the scope of the “global war on terror,” to stress its metaphorical character: describing it, for instance, not merely as a war against certain groups, but more broadly as “a war of ideas”58 and a general struggle against “violent extremism”59 or even just “extremism.”60 At the same time, the assertion by the administration of broad executive war powers to hold indefinitely any person it claimed to be an “international terrorist” or to “support such terrorists”61 (and the broad statutory grants that were ultimately given to the executive to detain and try through military commissions a broad category of “enemy combatants”62) depended on treating the war very much as a literal one. Yet the notion that the President has unilateral authority to decide to (for example) detain anyone he classifies as an enemy combatant in a war for which the “battlefield” (as one senior administration official put it) “is everywhere”63 is extraordinary; and it is therefore not surprising that when required to justify the scope of its authority in court, the Bush administration frequently equivocated on whether the literal war for which it claimed war powers was a global war on terrorism or a more narrowly circumscribed and (somewhat) more conventional war in Afghanistan, Iraq, or against al Qaeda.64 If this continuing and intentional ambiguity between the metaphorical and the literal helped to evade serious consideration of the implications of a modern, liberal state (and further the executive of a constitutional state) declaring a literal war on terrorism, global in scope and permanent in duration, the evasion of that question was aided as well though the second kind of ambiguity that we have discussed, concerning the nature of the “declaration” of the war itself. While on the one hand, then, the administration claimed authority derived from the AUMF as a declaration that put the United States in a stance of war against various enemies, including “terrorism” in general, the administration and its supporters also suggested that it was not the United States that (exercitively) declared war on “terrorism,” but that “[j]ust as . . . [it was] the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor” that established “a state of war . . . between the United States and the Empire of Japan . . . so, too,” the war on terrorism existed “immediately following the 9/11 attacks upon the United States”—65 or even that before then, “terrorists were at war with us”66—and that Congress’s resolution was nothing more than its “official recognition of a state of war”67 already in existence. If the war against terrorism is not a war that the nation has initiated, but a condition in which the country finds itself, it is easier to avoid the question of what it would mean to declare a literal war against such an enemy. And here again we see the synergy of the two ambiguities that I have identified. In the very slippage between the exercitive act of establishing a condition of war and the verdictive act of recognizing an existing condition, the idea of a war of terrorism slides more easily toward the literal. In asserting broad powers to fight “terrorism” wherever it existed, the administration and its supporters did not distinguish in principle between foreign and domestic exercises of that power or between citizens and aliens. The administration thus asserted a right to “capture” and detain those whom it called unlawful enemy combatants equally on American soil and overseas. And the Military Commissions Act of 2006, though it did distinguish between aliens and citizens, authorized the administration to try in a military tribunal any alien engaged in what it broadly termed “hostilities against the United States” for a wide range of what would otherwise be simple crimes, including what it called (without further definition) “attacks” on civilian property.68 But if on the one hand, the war on terrorism was used as justification for removing certain persons and acts from the criminal justice system, on the other, the war on terrorism was incorporated into the criminal law. The USA PATRIOT Act, for example, gave the FBI the authority to obtain, without a warrant or the need to provide any supporting evidence to a court, “any tangible things” as part of an investigation of either citizens or noncitizens, merely by asserting that it was acting to “protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”69 The term “clandestine intelligence activity” was left undefined, while the definition of “international terrorism” was expanded (by removing the existing requirement that it involve “assassination or kidnapping”) to include any action that “transcends national boundaries” or is committed by a person “operat[ing]” across international lines if it “appear[s] to be intended” to “influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion,” if it could be “dangerous” to human life, and if it violates any “of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State.”70 (There is no requirement that the violation of law be for the purpose of “intimidation or coercion,” that there be an intent to endanger human life, or that any person be actually harmed.) The same definition, without the international requirement, was then employed in establishing a new category of “domestic terrorism,” which, along with “international terrorism,” became the basis for a number of other new legal penalties and liabilities, including asset forfeiture.71 We cannot know how expansively this category of terrorism, with its special procedures and penalties, will be treated in the future. But on a broad reading of such terms as “coercion” and “dangerous,” it could easily end up including, for example, civil disobedience and other forms of protest that directly or incidentally involve violation of some federal or state crime. (Had this definition of domestic terrorism been in place during the civil rights movement, it is difficult to believe that it would not have been construed by the FBI to include the use of what Martin Luther King referred to as “direct action” intended “to . . . create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue.”72) The FBI’s counterterrorism division has already moved very much in this direction, adopting, for example, a broad definition of “ecoterrorism” as any “use or threatened use of violence of a criminal nature against innocent victims or property by an environmentally oriented subnational group for environmental–political reasons, or aimed at an audience beyond the target, often of a symbolic nature”—such as Greenpeace’s cutting of drift nets used by commercial fishing operations.73 In the broadest version of it, and the version toward which the Bush administration was increasingly moving, the domestic war on terrorism tended toward identifying the nation with the entirety of the existing structure of state power, policy, and law, while including as enemies of the nation those who commit any violations of the law as part of a political or social movement to pressure a government or a private entity to change policy. To the extent that the war on terrorism is treated as a literal war, the implications of defining the nation and its enemies in this way are daunting.74

#### The traditional concept of peace doesn’t exist – war powers mandate social systems to declare war on one population to create peace for another – reflection on the conceptual state of war precedes instrumental solutions.

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It is not simply wrong to argue that the difference between war and its other is disappearing. There is plenty of evidence for the overlap between the practices of war and the practices of peace in the contemporary world. Yet, this view is not complete or complex enough to provide a truly telling insight into the problem of war, especially in its current form. I want now to turn to a series of thinkers who, while acknowledging the inter-penetration of war and its other in the contemporary world, have also provided a more nuanced account of how that complex is experienced or what it might mean.¶ Although he includes the War on Terror in his discussion, to Achille Mbembe, it is the colonial war that is the archetype of the state of war in the contemporary. In Mbembe, the distinction between war and peace, as well as between state and non-state combatants, has broken down, leaving the identity of war itself in crisis. This is the flipside of the crisis of the thinking of the social we derived at the end of our discussion of Derrida. The increasing difficulty of defining a clear distinction between war and its other produces a crisis in the definition of war as much as of the social.¶ Mbembe’s aim is to reveal a style of sovereignty whose function is not the achievement of political autonomy, but “the generalised instrumentalisation of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations” (Mbembe, 2003, p. 14). He thus goes beyond accounts of sovereignty as the state of exception, arguing that this is a mere preliminary to the exercise of a “right to kill” (p. 16). Sovereignty then creates “death-worlds, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring on them the status of living dead” (p. 40). Mbembe argues that one of the central critiques of modernity has focussed on the “complete conflation of war and politics” (p. 18), identified with Nazism. The historical origins of the logic the Nazis put into practice, however, is to be found in colonialism. The colonial—and later apartheid systems— gave rise to a “unique terror formation” displaying a “concatenation of biopower, the state of exception and the state of siege” (p. 22). Mbembe goes on: “the colony represents the site where sovereignty consists fundamentally in the exercise of a power outside the law . . . and where ‘peace’ is more likely to take on the face of a ‘war without end’ ” (p. 23). In this context, “the distinction between war and peace does not avail” (p.25). Colonial war does not simply aim at the pacification of the colony. War – whether enacted through explicit armed conflict or through the uninterrupted terrorisation of the local population, or through processes of administration that divide communities, uproot crops and orchards, hold populations in indefinite bureaucratic paralysis (at permit offices and check-points), disable economic relationships or explicitly arrest, detain and kill arbitrarily – becomes colonial normality. “The fiction of a distinction between ‘the ends of war’ and ‘the means of war’ collapses” (p. 25).¶ Mbembe evokes Deleuze and Guattari’s trope of the “war-machine” to describe the related death-world where warfare has become dissociated from the state. He uses Africa as an example: ¶ Here, the political economy of statehood dramatically changed over the last quarter of the twentieth century. Many African states can no longer claim a monopoly on violence and on the means of coercion within their territory. Nor can they claim a monopoly on territorial boundaries. Coercion itself has become a market commodity. Military fighting power [sic] is bought and sold on a market in which the identity of suppliers and purchasers means almost nothing. Urban militias, private armies, armies of regional lords, private security firms, and state armies all claim the right to exercise violence or to kill. Neighbouring states or rebel movements lease armies to poor states. Nonstate deployers of violence supply two critical coercive resources: labour and minerals. Increasingly, the vast majority of armies are composed of citizen soldiers: child soldiers, mercenaries and privateers. (Mbembe, 2003, p. 32) ¶ We have witnessed how such arrangements, entangled with struggles over resources destined for western markets, from diamonds to the opium poppy, quickly establish themselves in regions where the state has been destabilised and becomes only a bit-player, like Afghanistan and Iraq. It would be naïve to find [sic] such a model becoming generalised directly, but given that the consequences of climate change remain unpredictable, and the tenor of Mbembe’s argument is that what happens in the post-colonial world might be repeated in the supposedly developed world (colony prefigures camp), it would be foolish therefore to dismiss these developments as of only local interest.¶ Herfried Münkler picks up this very point in an account of The New Wars. Citing Trutz von Throta, Münkler speculates about whether the present state of war in Africa might say more about the future of the developed world than its past (Münkler, 2005, p. 34). The analogy between an autonomous, self-motivating and more or less continuous war that simply feeds off itself and the War on Terror—let alone the wars declared in western societies on drugs, crime, poverty and so on—is hard to resist. How does Münkler characterise these wars? They are first and foremost wars without noticeable beginning and achievable end. “They begin somehow or other, and end somewhere or other. Scarcely any of the parties can say clearly which purposes and aims are being pursued by means of the war” (p. 33). Many of the processes of the legitimate daylight global economy and culture feed this propensity to war. The new wars are fed by their “insertion into the process of economic globalisation or shadow globalisation, and the development of new constellations of interests geared not to the ending of war but to its theoretically endless continuation” (pp. 32–3). The distinction between combatants and non-combatants breaks down (p. 15), exposing women in particular to a sexual violence now used unambiguously as a weapon of terror and ethnic domination. Indeed, Münkler draws attention to “the extensive sexualisation of violence that is observable in nearly all the new wars” (p. 86). Strategic goals fade in the face of an “economy . . . of violence . . . one big torture machine whose purpose is to produce pain and suffering but not to enforce a political will” (p. 86).¶ This development in which war has become a self-generating activity is perhaps the most explicit repudiation we have met of Clausewitz’s instrumentalist account of warfare. Again, Münkler reads it as symptomatic of a structural crisis in contemporary sociality. The supposed modern rules of warfare, established at the end of the Thirty Years’ War, in which states co-existed inside agreed boundaries and exercised a monopoly on violence within their own territory, are really what is at stake in the new wars. A generalised and irregular warfare, which preceded the formation of the state, now returns at the other end of the period of rational warfare, where the state is starting to break down: [T]here is also the question of whether [the new wars] can in a sense be described as a return to a stage prior to Europe’s early modern statization of war; a look at that earlier period is a suitable way of bringing out similarities with the conditions in which the state is no longer what it was then not yet: the monopolist of war. (Münkler, 2005, p. 2)¶ This spread of war sweeps up even the organisations whose aim is to bring peace, such as international aid agencies, which get caught up in the economy of war by making resources available that can swiftly end up on the black market: “what was supposed to relieve hunger and poverty becomes a resource of war” (p. 18). Yet, this model of a continuous war “with neither an identifiable beginning or a clearly defined end” (p. 15) also describes wars in which states are now engaged. The war in Iraq and the War on Terror, as well as the generalised use of warfare as the language of social policy, prove [sic] the limits of the instrumentalist account of war. Torture, extraordinary rendition, imprecise bombing, rape, as well as the intensification of police action, legislation to restrict press freedom and civil and human rights more generally, all find [sic] the state spreading terror, executing arbitrary power, cultivating heightened social division and insinuating suspicion into social relations. It is, of course, arguable that this has always been a resource to which the state has easily and readily turned, and Derrida, for example, has argued that all states are by definition “rogue states” (Derrida, 2005). However, what we find [sic] now is not the use of these techniques in pursuit of specific social goals (economic, geopolitical or racial domination, for example), but as a substitute for sociality in general, in a social, even global, war without term. Terror becomes not a tool, but a form of continuous tension, from which some may profit, while others remain cowed. As Mbembe’s description of the Israeli occupation of Palestine outlines, this kind of war soon becomes normalised, a state of constant intimidation and emergency. The wars on drugs and crime that have dominated social policy in certain western countries achieve nothing more than this state of permanent unsettling of the social order.¶ Here, we find [sic] the historical realisation of a non-Clausewitzian version of war. The generalisation of war as a type of peace with peace’s aims shows that the deconstruction of the war/peace and friend/enemy dichotomies we have outlined in Derrida is not simply a piece of abstruse theorising. The historical situation in which we live is not one where war and its other are clear alternatives. Given we are in a perpetual state of low-level conflict in which acts of war and the rhetoric of the social combine with one another in complex ways, it is chimerical to even believe that the tangle can be rationalised into discrete alternatives wherein we can actually withdraw our troops, pressure our governments, discipline our corporations and pacify our popular culture in order to construct an enduring peace. As we have found [sic], this tangle persists in our understandings of what society is, even when they attempt to simplify it. Mbembe and Münkler show that this situation is not merely theoretical.¶ It is thus too simple to think of [sic] this complex state of affairs as simply the implementation of policy, as the widespread reference to Clausewitz would imply, nor as merely the erasure of difference between war and its other. The generalisation of war as Mbembe and Münkler describe it reveals a world in which the intensification of war in one place—one part of the world or fraction of society—has as its aim the consolidation of peace in another. Violence in the occupied zone or the failed state coincides with the uninhibited extension of luxury and security elsewhere. The sacralisation of the victims of the September 11 attacks, when viewed in a global context, is evidence of a society unable to believe that the violence it was accustomed to witness, even enact, elsewhere could be visited on its very heartland. The sense of outrage, even injustice, this provoked is illustrative of a global situation where violence is normalised but not evenly spread. The spreading administration of violence in one place is the securing of peace elsewhere, and it is this very contradiction that allows the violence to be rationalised. This then confirms the deconstructive account in which war and peace only attain their co-ordination because of the irreducible disjunction between them.¶

#### We must understand war as constantly evolving – attempting to strive for peace ignores that war is always the medium – understanding war as an unstable concept allows for adaptation of political understanding to cope with the political uncertainty of the future.

- Our current conditions of war can’t be changed if we don’t seek to understand war itself.

War as a term can only be defined in relation to its opposite, such as peace, love, et cetera, BUT that opposite is always changing.

Rejection of war in favor of its opposites ignores how war is always fought in the name of realizing these states of peace.

The future will inevitably bring new social, political problems that will be impossible to address with one grand solution.

Instead we must understand war not as a stable concept but as ever evolving.

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The aim of this book has been to show that war is always defined in relation to something else, what we have called its other. This other may vary: it may be society, sovereign authority, politics, love, peace, friendship or something else. What is important about this relationship is not that it defines what war is opposite to and distinct from nor does it simply identify what the mechanism is that uses war as an instrument. It reveals the context within which war must emerge. This is not simply the historical or political context. Historical context is important, of course. Each thinker that we have studied can be said to be reacting to the specific war that defined or dominated their era: Hobbes, the religious and civil wars of the seventeenth century; Clausewitz, the wars of the revolutionary and Napoleonic era, in which the people became a major player for the first time; Freud, the First World War; Foucault, the war of the racial Holocaust; Virilio, the Cold War of Mutually Assured Destruction; Baudrillard, the First Gulf War; Žižek, the War on Terror and so on. Sometimes this address is direct and conscious; sometimes implicit and incidental. Their accounts, however, emerge in more than an historical context: they rely on a conceptual context as well, in which war is not just a literal material situation, but an abstraction or an idea. This is what makes war available as part of the unfolding of human meaning. In this way, war itself is not the problem. It is the way war is implicated in and required by other denominations of human meaning that condemns us to repeated bouts of official violence. War never emerges outside of a relationship to some conceptual other, and it is in the complexity of this relationship that our future fortunes of war will be determined.¶ As we have found [sic], this relationship can never be thought [sic] to stabilise simply around the idea that war and its other are opposites or merely continuous with one another. Even in the accounts of Hobbes and Kant, for example, the idea that war and civil society are opposites proves to be a much more complex argument than it at first appears: in the Hobbesian version, we find that civil society may seem to supplant the natural state of war, but is in fact, the fulfilment of war’s ostensible purposes. In Kant, peace emerges as a progression beyond war, but only by way of it. In both these arguments, the relationship between war and peace is not one of simple contrast, but of complex entanglement, in which peace never quite leaves war behind, indeed continues to depend on it. In our time, on the other hand, we find [sic]f a kind of Clausewitzian consensus, in which war is thought of [sic] as co-ordinated with both international diplomatic and domestic social policy, as a vast para-military police action in which unruly lapsed allies are disciplined or various kinds of social deviancy defined and excoriated. Theorists are quick to argue that what we find [sic] here is the increasing disappearance of any difference between war and its other. Yet, while this generalisation of war seems to be taking place, at no time has war been less publicly acceptable nor more automatically rejected—even indiscriminately and pre-emptively—by vast sections of the population. The generalised moral revulsion at war is not a real obstacle to war nor does it herald its demise. Indeed, while their constituents demonstrate against wars and ridicule them on blogs, politicians seem paralysed when it comes to contesting the determination of heads of government to resort to warfare. As Ryan C Hendrickson has argued in The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress and War Powers (Hendrickson, 2002), the US Congress has been increasingly reluctant to resist the will of a president who has decided on military action, even when it has the constitutional power to do so. The general revulsion at war therefore is not necessarily incompatible with a generalisation of war in practice. Indeed, my aim has been to show the opposite: that the general deployment and the general rejection of war are part of a single complex. It is much too simple, however, to find [sic] this complex as part of a willing ignorance [sic] on the part of the bulk of humanity, wherein moral comfort and self-regard would be assured by rejection of war even though affluent lifestyles may depend on war for their continued opportunity. It is too easy to think of [sic] the war problem simply morally, that we play at rejecting wars from which we are actually happy to profit. Our rejection of war, like our purported commitment to democracy and human rights, is not merely hypocritical. It must be understood as part of a complex in which war and its other emerge together in a double relationship in which they both encourage and refuse one another: we reject war because it ruins social relations, shatters bodies and savages our human rights. Yet, we also look to war to preserve the social, protect threatened lives and enlarge rights. War kills and saves simultaneously. It destroys the things in the name of which it is implemented. To think of [sic] a loss of difference between war and its other is to overlook the complex situations in which war emerges and which keep it alive despite our moral repugnance and endless official lamentations for those of us whom it has annihilated.¶ To say that war is double and that it is implicated conceptually in other values that we want to preserve is not to simply say that we should be resigned to war enduring. It is an attempt to provide a new and useful way by which war can be understood, and argues, as all analysis does, that material situations like war cannot be dealt with if they are not understood, and that new ways must continually be sought to rethink them. Theory is not an enduring ideal truth to be applied to practical situations, but the invention of new conceptual forms that may help us represent and explain hitherto obscure or enigmatic phenomena. Thinking of war in terms of the war/other complex means always understanding [sic] the emergence of war as the deployment of something else with it. The two must always appear in relationship with one another even if they are considered to be antagonistic or mutually destructive. So war and whatever its other might be in a particular context, facilitate the emergence of one another, even in their defiance of one another. It is this inseparability of war and its other that makes it possible to understand [sic] war and its other as co-ordinated. What was Nazi war but a tribute, in its most organised and exultant murderousness, to life? What was Communist insurgency but the most regimented and anonymous embrace of the possibilities of freedom? And what are democracy’s post-1989 wars but the most brutal and oppressive attempt to spread human rights?¶ These complex situations can and should not be disguised by an eternal but vacuous resort to morality. The logic that attributes the doubleness of war to hypocrisy is a singularly unenlightening example of the ascendancy of moral discourse in discussions of war. Of course, our attitude to war must be moral: we could not protect ourselves from the cult of official violence if it were not, nor could we begin to understand [sic] war as a problem and something to be surpassed, something I have assumed as relatively uncontentious from the outset. Yet, because war is politically, economically, and above all, conceptually situated, it must be recognised not as primarily a moral, but a political problem. Since the Vietnam War, resistance to war has been fundamentally based on revulsion at its violence and destructiveness and the popular culture that naturalise it. This resistance has been primarily rhetorical and gestural, as it befits its interest in the aesthetics of war and in tune with the general aestheticisation of politics of the time. It has rested on general humanist clichés about community, fraternity and an ideal social future. In other words, it has relied on a banal and unsustainable understanding of the mutual alienation of the human and war. This conception is not wrong in any simple sense, but it is too uncomplicated to deal with the dynamics of the war/other complex, in which the human can be as much a justification for war as reason for scepticism towards it, and is indeed probably both. To engage with war properly, we have to realise that this kind of opposition is not enough. When war is in play, so is something else, war’s various others. Humanist sentimentality often attempts to present what we have identified as war’s others as unquestionable or non-negotiable: How can we possibly contest the value implicit in love, or sociality or human rights? Is not this the worst kind of post-modern relativism, in which we allow what should be absolute values to be held up for debate? Yet it is these various “values” that accompany and facilitate the emergence of war, and that always wrong-foot us when we attempt to reject it. Do we not want dictators to be removed, women’s rights restored and ethnic cleansing resisted? If we are in favour of these goals, how can we resist the wars that aim to achieve them? Does not this make the rejection of war merely automatic and adolescent?¶ The refusal to debate these values results in both an impotent and unworldly rejection of war, on the one hand, and a mindless acquiescence to it, on the other. The argument of this book has been that it is necessary to understand the complexity of the implication of such values in war. This understanding requires the courage to rethink these values and the political will to engage unsentimentally with their historical function. Questioning war must involve a questioning of the very things in the name of which wars are fought, not in order simply to reject them, but to engage properly with their real historical and political function. If you are unwilling to deal with this dynamic and seek mere recourse to absolute rejections of war, or absolute endorsement of the values that oppose (and/or allow) war, then you risk remaining stuck in the cycle from which politics should always be attempting to free us. Just because they have failed us and have proven corrupt, easily intimidated and willingly compromised, we should not exempt parliaments from being one place amongst others where such politics should take place. In short, wherever it happens, the politics of war must also provide a properly critical account of war’s other.¶ Our inherited models of politics have opted either for the grand narrative approach to the realisation of optimal ideological goals or else a molecularism, in which social fractions either withstand or disrupt the forces attempting to limit them. The first relies on a model of a uniform and collective trajectory of human development, which can no longer be sustained, as well as having a weak understanding of what Foucault so ably identified as the “regional” (Foucault, 2003, p. 27) way in which power operates. The second fails to produce more general insight into the dynamics of human collectivity, the politics of the economic in particular. The pitting of these two models of politics against one another defined post-modern debate. Yet, we may be now confronting a political epoch in which neither of these ways of thinking about politics helps us: the first because it aims to recover an older sense of human universality that is long gone, irrecoverable, ineffective and probably already unlamented; the second because the radical disruption of identity and administration, however relevant it remains to challenging the silent violence of culture, policy and social institutions, will not reassemble the sites of collective intention, scrutiny and negotiation that we will need in order to deal with the challenges of the politics of climate change—economic activity discovering its final limits, the resulting dislocation of human populations inequitably experienced, the threat of states acting unilaterally to secure their interests regardless of the consequences and so on. What we will be confronting will be a series of situations that will not be easily assimilable to theoretical models developed in wholly different contexts, co-ordinated as they were, first, with the expansion and, then, the contraction of Western historicity. This future could well produce a set of unfolding or overlapping crises in which wars develop. It will be absolutely crucial to understand the dynamic behind these wars: What are they being fought for? It may be true that globalisation will not result in the liquidation of the nation state, as Hirst and others have argued. Yet, in the twenty-first century, however pragmatically persistent the nation state may be, it lacks any enduring sense of natural inevitability, and contests with economic, religious and ethnic allegiances which may co-ordinate with it—from the potentially unknowable flows of capital through an increasingly abstract financial market to the bonds of fundamentalist dogmatism— but which may overwhelm it as well. There is and will continue to be a remaking of the plural relationships that will cluster around a set of unrecognisable warfares. War will not perhaps be the instrument of established social collectivities or an expression of their values, but the thing that brings them into existence in the first place, inventing ideological and dogmatic formations hitherto unknown, or loose coalitions of established national and international institutions. Who will fight which wars in the name of what? As we have found [sic], what gives rise to a war, what justifies it can also define the very point of view from which it can be resisted, not that our attitude to war should always and everywhere be simply one of refusal. Economic security, political rights and even peace are examples of the double constructs in the name of which war can be both defended and critiqued.¶ My argument is that, given the unpredictability of our political future and the superannuation of the political models we have inherited, a theoretical construct like the war/other complex may provide one way in which future situations may be thought not ideologically but pragmatically. Traditionally war has been treated as if it is a discrete event, anticipated by causes and followed by consequences, but a singular thing nevertheless. The war/other complex allows us to think of [sic] war in its embeddedness in the unfolding of global social relations in general. In this way, it may not only provide a more pragmatic way of understanding a future politics, but by reinventing new ways of imagining the collective and the specific dynamic by which it may subsume individual bodies and events, it may take over the function of our previous political paradigms.¶

#### Metaphor is everywhere and unavoidable BUT there are certain metaphors that are detrimental.

The argument-as-war metaphor utilized by debate becomes a form of rhetorical violence that puts participants and critics at odds with each other.

The metaphorical guides the literal as conceptions of argument-as-war makes it so.

Lakoff and Johnson, ‘80 [George Lakoff, Richard and Rhoda Goldman Distinguished Professor of Cognitive Science and Linguistics at the University of California at Berkeley; Mark Johnson, Knight Professor of Liberal Arts and Sciences in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Oregon; excerpt from "Metaphors We Live By"; http://theliterarylink.com/metaphors.html]

Metaphor is for most people device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish--a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language. Moreover, metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. For this reason, most people think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.¶ The concepts that govern our thought are not just matters of the intellect. They also govern our everyday functioning, down to the most mundane details. Our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other people. Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities. If we are right in suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we thinks what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor. ¶But our conceptual system is not something we are normally aware of. in most of the little things we do every day, we simply think and act more or less automatically along certain lines. Just what these lines are is by no means obvious. One way to find out is by looking at language. Since communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in thinking and acting, language is an important source of evidence for what that system is like.¶ Primarily on the basis of linguistic evidence, we have found that most of our ordinary conceptual system is metaphorical in nature. And we have found a way to begin to identify in detail just what the metaphors are halt structure how we perceive, how we think, and what we do.¶ To give some idea of what it could mean for a concept to be metaphorical and for such a concept to structure an everyday activity, let us start with the concept ARGUMENT and the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR. This metaphor is reflected in our everyday language by a wide variety of expressions:

ARGUMENT IS WAR

Your claims are indefensible.

She [sic] attacked every weak point in my argument.

Her [sic] criticisms were right on target.

I demolished his argument.

I've never won an argument with him.

you disagree? Okay, shoot!

If you use that strategy, he'll wipe you out.

She [sic] shot down all of my arguments.

It is important to know [sic] that we don't just talk about arguments in terms of war. We can actually win or lose arguments. We think of [sic] the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our own. We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we can abandon it and take a new line of attack. Many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war. Though there is no physical battle, there is a verbal battle, and the structure of an argument--attack, defense, counter-attack, etc.---reflects this. It is in this sense that the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is one that we live by in this culture; its structures the actions we perform in arguing. Try to imagine a culture where arguments are not viewed in terms of war, where no one wins or loses, where there is no sense of attacking or defending, gaining or losing ground. Imagine a culture where an argument is viewed as a dance, the participants are thought of [sic] as performers, and the goal is to perform in a balanced and aesthetically pleasing way. In such a culture, people would view arguments differently, experience them differently, carry them out differently, and talk about them differently. But we would probably not view them as arguing at all: they would simply be doing something different. It would seem strange even to call what they were doing "arguing." In perhaps the most neutral way of describing this difference between their culture and ours would be to say that we have a discourse form structured in terms of battle and they have one structured in terms of dance. This is an example of what it means for a metaphorical concept, namely, ARGUMENT IS WAR, to structure (at least in part) what we do and how we understand what we are doing when we argue. The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another. It is not that arguments are a subspecies of war. Arguments and wars are different kinds of things--verbal discourse and armed conflict--and the actions performed are different kinds of actions. But ARGUMENT is partially structured, understood, performed, and talked about in terms of WAR. The concept is metaphorically structured, the activity is metaphorically structured, and, consequently, the language is metaphorically structured. ¶Moreover, this is the ordinary way of having an argument and talking about one. The normal way for us to talk about attacking a position is to use the words "attack a position." Our conventional ways of talking about arguments presuppose a metaphor we are hardly ever conscious of. The metaphors not merely in the words we use--it is in our very concept of an argument. The language of argument is not poetic, fanciful, or rhetorical; it is literal. We talk about arguments that way because we conceive of them that way--and we act according to the way we conceive of thing¶The most important claim we have m ade so far is that metaphor is not just a matter of language, that is, of mere words. We shall argue that, on the contrary, human thought processes are largely metaphorical. This is what we mean when we say that the human conceptual system is metaphorically structured and defined. Metaphors as linguistic expressions are possible precisely because there are metaphors in a person's conceptual system. Therefore, whenever in this book we speak of metaphors, such as ARGUMENT IS WAR, it should be understood that metaphor means metaphorical concept.¶ THE SYSTEMATICITTY OF METAPHORICAL CONCEPTS¶ Arguments usually follow patterns; that is, there are certain things we typically do and do not do in arguing. The fact that we in part conceptualize arguments in terms of battle systematically influences the shape argument stake and the way we talk about what we do in arguing. Because the metaphorical concept is systematic, the language we use to talk about that aspect of the concept is systematic.¶We saw in the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor that expressions from the vocabulary of war, e.g., attack a position, indefensible, strategy, new line of attack, win, gain ground, etc., form a systematic way of talking about the battling aspects of arguing. It is no accident that these expressions mean what they mean when we use them to talk about arguments. A portion of the conceptual network of battle partially characterizes file concept of an argument, and the language follows suit. Since metaphorical expressions in our language are tied to metaphorical concepts in a systematic way, we can use metaphorical linguistic expressions to study the nature of metaphorical concepts and to gain an understanding of the metaphorical nature of our activities.

#### Vote aff to restrict the power of the war metaphor.

#### Just like there’s no one perfect definition of war, there’s no perfect definition of debate; the activity constitutes a multitude of different things in various contexts. The war metaphor antagonizes debaters and stifles debate’s potential.

#### The meaning behind language is not stagnant, but instead constantly fluctuating.

There are a vast number of replacements to the metaphor of argument as war. Instead of choosing just one, we should expand our rhetorical possibilities and never end the search for how to define and relate to debate.

Cohen, ’95 [Daniel H. Cohen, Ph.D., Philosophy, Indiana University. Professor of Philosophy at Colby College; “Argument is War ... and War is Hell: Philosophy, Education, and Metaphors for Argumentation”; Informal Logic Vol. 17, No.2 (Spring 1995)]

To be sure, there are alternative understandings of argumentation available. I think it completely justified to speak of the progress that has been made in characterizing argumentation by exploiting the resources of speech act theory, critical theory, formal logic, rhetorical analysis, and all the other relevant conceptual tools at our disposal. To take one example, arguments can be characterized in terms of their various linguistic roles or in terms of their effects as conversational episodes. From that perspective, one of the primary functions of an argument is "enhancing the acceptability of the speech act for which it is an argument."9 What I like about this particular formula, besides its succinct elegance, is how it abstracts to a level from which the adversarial element can be regarded as merely an accidental means to a more important end, and thereby allows for other means to that end. It creates room for answers to the question of why someone might seek arguments for something she already believes; the argument-is-war metaphor does not. It also endorses the possibility of arguing/or something without arguing against anybody; and again, the argument-is-war metaphor cannot accommodate that. Specifically, explanations qualify as arguments under this conception, and this seems meet since explanations constitute a large part of many arguments. Explanation can indeed serve as a kind of justification, and justification generally is the province of argument.¶This points to a way to articulate the connection between interpretation and argumentation that was suggested earlier: in order to understand some texts, a certain kind of sympathetic reading can be necessary. This might involve speculating about an author's motives, providing a charitable interpretation for apparently inconsistent passages, or the like. From the perspective provided by thinking of arguments along the speech-act lines just presented, reading looks a lot like arguing with the author. Readers need to argue with, meaning alongside, the author rather than with, meaning against, the author, in order to enhance whatever it is that the text is saying, showing, or doing. And, needless to say, authors and readers do not have to be adversaries. The "argument" between them is not adversarial. This is not, to be sure, how students of philosophy are typically taught to read a philosophical text. They are trained to read "critically," Le., they are trained to read with a combatant's eye, an eye that is open for any weaknesses in the argument that can be turned to advantage in a critical paper. All too often we read the way we argue in another respect: we read with "our defenses up" lest we be convinced of something we didn't want to believe. "I'll be damned if I'm going to let this author teach me something new!" Since this is not the attitude we want in the classroom, we should think along different lines:¶ (1) Argument is not war; it is reciprocal reading. ¶ Speech-act approaches have shown that they can shed light on the subject of argumentation. Unfortunately, what should be understood as helpful characterizations are all too often interpreted as definitive analyses or necessary and sufficient conditions, Le., as definitions. These can then be taken as challenges to other workers in the field to find or construct both counterexamples that should belong to the category but do not fit the description, and counterexamples that do fit the description but should not count as arguments. For the example at hand, it might be pointed out that one way of enhancing a speech act is to say it with a smile, but that should hardly count as an argument. Or, again, revising a poem seems a clear example of a speech-act-enhancing activity that is just as clearly not an argument. Arguments may include interpretations, but that does not make all interpreters into arguers. Conversely, when I tell my son to wear his seat belt, and answer his question, "Why?" by offering appropriate reasons, I am not arguing for or enhancing the acceptability of any speech-act, except under some ad hoc reading, although I am certainly arguing for some act: his buckling his seat belt. While it is certainly helpful to have as wide a variety of examples as possible at hand, this can degenerate into an esoteric exercise, indeed an idle academic exercise of exactly the same sort of nit-picking that I have just done with the counter-examples here. I have taken a very illuminating characterization and managed to show that, being very, very legalistic, it is, to no one's surprise, inadequate as a definition. What we need are not new definitions, but new metaphors. Fortunately, Aristotle was wrong in thinking that metaphor is the work of genius. On the contrary, metaphor is a linguistic commonplace, something that every competent language user understands and employs (although, to be sure, creating the brilliant metaphors that permanently reshape our thoughts is no mean feat).¶ I sometimes think that what good philosophizing and, more generally, effective teaching of any kind have in common is that they revolve around the same kind of activity: the search for just the right metaphor. Metaphors are more than merely elliptical similes or stylistic affectations for embellished expression. They are vehicles for making the unfamiliar familiar, which is what makes them particularly important for education. There is, however, something funny about characterizing metaphors as linguistic devices for articulating unfamiliar thoughts by transplanting them into a more familiar context: it buys into the questionable dichotomy of thought and language. The implied model is that we think things, and then we somehow translate them into written or spoken words. Thinking and speaking or writing are not nearly as easily distinguishable as this model suggests. There is some wisdom in the old chestnut "How am I supposed to know what I think until I hear what I have to say?" Metaphors are not just elegant or clever ways of conveying new thoughts; they are also ways of thinking new thoughts, of grasping those thoughts, and even of formulating them in the first place. And this is what makes the art of metaphor so important for philosophy. Because I think of both philosophy and education this way, I think the question that we really should be addressing is not where and how arguments fit into philosophy and education, but what metaphors for arguments fit in with the goals of philosophy and education. It is especially appropriate to ask the question in this form when philosophy and education are being sung in a Pragmatist key. ¶The meaning of a metaphor is invariably, and notoriously, under-determined. This is what stymies reading them as elliptical similes. Sure, arguments are like war, but how? Everything is like everything else in some respect, if we are but clever enough to sense [sic] it. Arguments are rafts on the sea of uncertainty carrying us to the terra firma of truth. Arguments are verbal dances responding to inaudible Gricean rhythms and unknown Jungian syllogisms. Arguments are the mortar holding together the bricks out of which theories are built. Arguments are mental exercises for athletes of the intellect. It is not hard, I think, to make sense out of any of these metaphors, but it is an amazing ability nonetheless. Interpreting metaphors is nearly the art that creating them is. ¶In some respects, interpreting metaphors may actually be the greater art. The exercise of creating metaphors can with relatively little effort be extended indefinitely. Even restricting ourselves just to traffic metaphors (and getting carried away with the exercise), we can say that arguments are (i) conversational traffic jams-(ii) gridlock with a lot of honking and little movement; (iii) arguments are conversational traffic accidents; (iv) they are wrong turns, or (v) detours, or (vi) dead ends or (vii) roundabouts on the streets of discourse; or should we have said that they are (viii) short cuts to the truth at the end of the road; maybe (ix) they are long and winding roads to nowhere; or, instead, we can conceive of arguments as (x) intellectual one way roads to their conclusionsalthough maybe they are really (xi) one-lane roads but with two-way traffic. More positively, they can be thought of as a case of (xii) a merging traffic of ideas or even better as (xiii) conceptual roads under construction. ¶ Conceptual connections like these can be constructed almost at will. The list can be expanded, if not ad infinitum, then at least ad nauseam, so that almost any arbitrarily constructed metaphor, even an initially inscrutable one, such as that arguments are the road kill alongside the highways of life (ad nauseam indeed!), can be made intelligible and plausible: both arguments and road kill are to be avoided, they are the tragic end for those who innocently enter areas of high traffic, they are what can happen when we aren't careful, and so on. Admittedly, this is stretching the point, but that is exactly what metaphors do so well. Still, the fact that so many traffic metaphors are so readily available suggests that they identify an important set of features about arguments, viz., something about their internal dynamics and the possible interactions that can arise from them.¶ In contrast to the argument-as-traffic metaphors, the argument-is-war metaphor makes a different point. What it emphasizes (or creates!) is the adversarial aspect of argumentation, which is why this particular metaphor is objectionable in the classroom. But, interpretation being an art, other conclusions could also be drawn from the metaphor. There will always be an indefinitely large supply of abstractable similarities between the tenor and vehicle of a metaphor, wars and arguments in this case. Wars may involve more than just two parties, but never less than two, and we usually assume that this is true of arguments as well; wars can be ended by simple agreement of the parties involved, and so can arguments; wars are occasions that test the national resolve and sense of identity, while arguments can do the same for the individual; wars need not end with a winner and a loser, because both sides might claim victory, when in fact both sides may have lost a great deal, and there is surely a counterpart for arguments.¶ Of course, there are also great differences that might be offered as counterexamples or counterbalances to the value of this metaphor. Wars can be prevented by diplomatic efforts, so they represent a failure of diplomacy. Arguments are not always symptomatic of communicative failure. Often they are the expressly intended product of rational inquiry! Indeed, if we include rational discourse under the rubric "diplomacy," then it is precisely arguments as we "officially" conceive them that can best prevent wars! Wars can be prevented by arguing, but arguing, obviously, cannot. Argument, as rational engagement, is antithetical to military engagement, and the metaphor would then have to be thought of [sic] as an ironic reversal. (Then again, if fighting for peace can make sense, so might arguing for agreement.) If arguments are to be a positive way of addressing differences, then¶ (2) Argument is not war; it is diplomatic negotiation.¶ Two of these just-mentioned features common to war and argument merit particular attention. First, wars never end up where they started. The status quo ante bellum can never really be achieved. What starts out as a war of principle, especially when successful, might well end up as a war of conquest, and, conversely, the unsuccessful war for conquest is transformed into a war of principle. Successful defensive re-actions inevitably seek to pre-empt any possible future transgressions. What, for example, was the American Civil War all about? The Vietnam War? The Gulf War? The answers that today's history books offer differ from the answers given by those wars' own contemporaries. ¶ Something very similar happens in arguments, especially when they are thought of as verbal wars. Interestingly, Imre Lakatos has made just this point with respect to mathematical proofs, the very paradigms for the "official" picture of arguments as exercises in pure reason. IO Proofs and refutations, he argued, are two parts of the same dialectical process. Counter-examples to proposed theorems, he maintained, do not in general function as real refutations. Rather, the role they most often play in mathematics is to demand further clarification of the intended range of the thesis or to seek greater articulation in the definitions of the concepts used. The theorems that result from, or survive, this process are inevitably changed by the process. That is, what a proof is "all about" changes as the proof proceeds, and this is no less applicable to other kinds of arguments.¶ (3) Thus, argument is not war; it is growth or adaptation. ¶ Wittgenstein reached a very similar conclusion about mathematical proofs, albeit for different reasons. II A proof, he asserted, never proves what it set out to prove. Proofs establish new conceptual connections between the thesis in question and other parts of the system of mathematics. These connections are constitutive of the meanings of the concepts involved, so the meaning of the sentence proved always has new semantic-conceptual accretions. Therefore, the sentence that has been proved, the theorem, can never have exactly the same meaning as the sentence to be proved, despite their typographic identity. In just the same way, to revert to an earlier example, no poem can really ever be revised because any revisions would, in a very real sense, result in a new and different poem. Is there a way to think of arguments as altering, or even constructing, new meanings? That is, can what an argument is "all about" be subject to the same sorts of historiographic revisions as the casus belli? It seems so. ¶ (4) That is, argument is not war; it is metamorphosis.¶ The other feature common to wars and arguments I want to note is that they are multiple-agent events (or, at least, multi-voice events, to accommodate those of us who habitually argue with themselves). It takes more than one party to start a war or an argument, it takes more than one party to sustain a war or argument, and it also takes more than one to finish a war or argument. Just as a war is never really over until both sides agree to a cessation of hostilities-otherwise there will be a prolonged guerrilla war, permanent tensions, or an uneasy truce without real peace-so too an argument is never really over until some sort of consensus has been achieved-lest there be continued verbal sniping, simmering resentments, or a lingering grudge beneath the surface. Arguments might result in situations that are analogous to the results of wars, but there is also the possibility that they end otherwise. Arguments may result in an exchange of ideas, rather than just the imposition of one side's ideas on the other. And this is certainly a legitimate pedagogical role for arguments. In the classroom, then, ¶ (5) Argument should not even be like war; it should be a kind of cross-pollination, leading to hybridization. ¶Alternatively, arguments can end in with the construction of a new conceptual order, as the Second World War gave birth to the United Nations. Ideally, in seminar ¶ (6) Argument is not at all war; it is brainstorming. ¶The best arguments, then, rather than being destructively adversarial, involve a constructive co-operation between their participants. If debate is to be contstructive for everyone involved, then ¶ (7) Instead of being a kind of war, argument can be more like a barnraising.¶Although the language of warfare is so readily used to describe arguments, there is a difference that is both obvious and important, but still easy to overlook: arguments, like brainstorming sessions or barn-raisings, can be desirable in a way that wars cannot. If we focus on the possible outcomes rather than the origins, the ends rather than the beginnings, then one way to conceptualize arguments is as those events in rational discourse that tend to create or lead to consensus. This combines the transformative-constructivist aspect with the multiple-agency aspect of arguments in a way that accommodates the move from philosophy as the pursuit-of-truth to philosophy as the pursuit-of-wisdom by shifting the balance in emphasis from (to borrow a phrase from Richard Rorty) objectivity to solidarity, while simultaneously respecting the possibility of non-competitive or even cooperative argumentation for educational ends. Simply put: "Let's hash it out" does not have to mean "let's fight it out." ¶Perhaps arguments are more like town meetings than anything else, because they are sometimes contentious, but sometimes co-operative; there may be several opposing factions, or only interested but as yet undecided citizens; sometimes they are divisive and inconclusive, but sometimes they are indeed constructive; they may begin with a consensus for action, and serve merely as strategy sessions for orchestrating actions, or they may begin with a cacophony of voices-and end the same way. For all its openness to the variety of forms arguments can take, the purposes they can serve, and the many possible outcomes that can result from them, in the end, I don't think the town-meeting metaphor serves very well. It will not challenge the argument-is-war metaphor, if only because town meetings do not occupy as prominent a place in our conceptual geography as war. War is, however, a dangerous metaphor, particularly when it has been allowed to form, to deform, argumentation in the classroom. Other metaphors are available, and still others that are even better are waiting to be created, but in the end I am skeptical that any single metaphor can fit all the shapes that arguments take or serve all the purposes that arguments serve. In that case, we do not really need to come up with a new metaphor to reflect and reform our practice; we need instead to traffic in as many metaphors as possible-including all those traffic metaphors!

# 2AC

### Flex

#### War powers’ expertism uniquely fails AND is supercharged by secret information – aff prevents serial policy failure.

Rana, ’11 [Aziz Rana received his A.B. summa cum laude from Harvard College and his J.D. from Yale Law School. He also earned a Ph.D. in political science at Harvard, where his dissertation was awarded the university's Charles Sumner Prize. He was an Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fellow in Law at Yale; “Who Decides on Security?”; 8/11/11; Cornell Law Library; <http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers/87/>]

Despite such democratic concerns, a large part of what makes today’s dominant security concept so compelling are two purportedly objective sociological claims about the nature of modern threat. As these claims undergird the current security concept, by way of a conclusion I would like to assess them more directly and, in the process, indicate what they suggest about the prospects for any future reform. The first claim is that global interdependence means that the U.S. faces near continuous threats from abroad. Just as Pearl Harbor presented a physical attack on the homeland justifying a revised framework, the American position in the world since has been one of permanent insecurity in the face of new, equally objective dangers. Although today these threats no longer come from menacing totalitarian regimes like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, they nonetheless create of world of chaos and instability in which American domestic peace is imperiled by decentralized terrorists and aggressive rogue states. Second, and relatedly, the objective complexity of modern threats makes it impossible for ordinary citizens to comprehend fully the causes and likely consequences of existing dangers. Thus, the best response is the further entrenchment of Herring’s national security state, with the U.S. permanently mobilized militarily to gather intelligence and to combat enemies wherever they strike – at home or abroad. Accordingly, modern legal and political institutions that privilege executive authority and insulated decisionmaking are simply the necessary consequence of these externally generated crises. Regardless of these trade-offs, the security benefits of an empowered presidency (one armed with countless secret and public agencies as well as with a truly global military footprint)188 greatly outweigh the costs. Yet, although these sociological views have become commonplace, the conclusions that Americans should draw about security requirements are not nearly as clear cut as the conventional wisdom assumes. In particular, a closer examination of contemporary arguments about endemic danger suggests that such claims are not objective empirical judgments but rather are socially complex and politically infused interpretations. Indeed, the openness of existing circumstances to multiple interpretations of threat implies that the presumptive need for secrecy and centralization is not self-evident. And as underscored by high profile failures in expert assessment, claims to security expertise are themselves riddled with ideological presuppositions and subjective biases. All this indicates that the gulf between elite knowledge and lay incomprehension in matters of security may be far less extensive than is ordinarily thought. It also means that the question of who decides – and with it the issue of how democratic or insular our institutions should be – remains open as well. Clearly technological changes, from airpower to biological and chemical weapons, have shifted the nature of America’s position in the world and its potential vulnerability. As has been widely remarked for nearly a century, the oceans alone cannot guarantee our permanent safety. Yet, in truth they never fully ensured domestic tranquility. The nineteenth century was one of near continuous violence, especially with indigenous communities fighting to protect their territory from expansionist settlers. But even if technological shifts make doomsday scenarios more chilling than those faced by Hamilton, Jefferson, or Taney, the mere existence of these scenarios tells us little about their likelihood or how best to address them. Indeed, these latter security judgments are inevitably permeated with subjective political assessments, assessments that carry with them preexisting ideological points of view – such as regarding how much risk constitutional societies should accept or how interventionist states should be in foreign policy. In fact, from its emergence in the 1930s and 1940s, supporters of the modern security concept have – at times unwittingly – reaffirmed the political rather than purely objective nature of interpreting external threats. In particular, commentators have repeatedly noted the link between the idea of insecurity and America’s post-World War II position of global primacy, one which today has only expanded following the Cold War. In 1961, none other than Senator James William Fulbright declared, in terms reminiscent of Herring and Frankfurter, that security imperatives meant that “our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century,” was no longer “adequate” for the “20th- century nation.” For Fulbright, the driving impetus behind the need to jettison antiquated constitutional practices was the importance of sustaining the country’s “preeminen[ce] in political and military power.” Fulbright held that greater executive action and war-making capacities were essential precisely because the United States found itself “burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power.”192 According to Fulbright, the United States had both a right and a duty to suppress those forms of chaos and disorder that existed at the edges of American authority. Thus, rather than being purely objective, the American condition of permanent danger was itself deeply tied to political calculations about the importance of global primacy. What generated the condition of continual crisis was not only technological change, but also the belief that the United States’ own ‘national security’ rested on the successful projection of power into the internal affairs of foreign states. The key point is that regardless of whether one agrees with such an underlying project, the value of this project is ultimately an open political question. This suggests that whether distant crises should be viewed as generating insecurity at home is similarly as much an interpretative judgment as an empirically verifiable conclusion. To appreciate the open nature of security determinations, one need only look at the presentation of terrorism as a principal and overriding danger facing the country. According to the State Department’s Annual Country Reports on Terrorism, in 2009 “[t]here were just 25 U.S. noncombatant fatalities from terrorism worldwide” (sixteen abroad and nine at home).194 While the fear of a terrorist attack is a legitimate concern, these numbers – which have been consistent in recent years – place the gravity of the threat in perspective. Rather than a condition of endemic danger – requiring everincreasing secrecy and centralization – such facts are perfectly consistent with a reading that Americans do not face an existential crisis (one presumably comparable to Pearl Harbor) and actually enjoy relative security. Indeed, the disconnect between numbers and resources expended, especially in a time of profound economic insecurity, highlights the political choice of policymakers and citizens to persist in interpreting foreign events through a World War II and early Cold War lens of permanent threat. In fact, the continuous alteration of basic constitutional values to fit ‘national security’ aims highlights just how entrenched Herring’s old vision of security as pre-political and foundational has become, regardless of whether other interpretations of the present moment may be equally compelling. It also underscores a telling and often ignored point about the nature of modern security expertise, particularly as reproduced by the United States’ massive intelligence infrastructure. To the extent that political assumptions – like the centrality of global primacy or the view that instability abroad necessarily implicates security at home – shape the interpretative approach of executive officials, what passes as objective security expertise is itself intertwined with contested claims about how to view external actors and their motivations. This means that while modern conditions may well be complex, the conclusions of the presumed experts may not be systematically less liable to subjective bias than judgments made by ordinary citizens based on publicly available information. It further underscores that the question of who decides cannot be foreclosed in advance by simply asserting deference to elite knowledge. If anything, one can argue that the presumptive gulf between elite awareness and suspect mass opinion has generated its own very dramatic political and legal pathologies. In recent years, the country has witnessed a variety of security crises built on the basic failure of ‘expertise.’ 195 At present, part of what obscures this fact is the very culture of secret information sustained by the modern security concept. Today, it is commonplace for government officials to leak security material about terrorism or external threat to newspapers as a method of shaping the public debate. These ‘open’ secrets allow greater public access to elite information and embody a central and routine instrument for incorporating mass voice into state decision-making. But this mode of popular involvement comes at a key cost. Secret information is generally treated as worthy of a higher status than information already present in the public realm – the shared collective information through which ordinary citizens reach conclusions about emergency and defense. Yet, oftentimes, as with the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003, although the actual content of this secret information is flawed, its status as secret masks these problems and allows policymakers to cloak their positions in added authority. This reality highlights the importance of approaching security information with far greater collective skepticism; it also means that security judgments may be more ‘Hobbesian’ – marked fundamentally by epistemological uncertainty as opposed to verifiable fact – than policymakers admit.

### AT Heg – Myth D and Turn

Hegemony is a myth without historical basis – upholding the fiction of American domination causes lash out and prevents possibility for cooperation

Doran, ‘9 [Charles F. Doran, Andrew W. Mellon Prof. of International Relations, Director of the Global Theory and History Program, and Director of the Center for Canadian Studies at Johns Hopkins University; “Fooling Oneself: The Mythology of Hegemony” International Studies Review, Vol. 11.1. 2009]

More than a catalogue of techniques other governments use to resist U.S. titular hegemony, this book informs an important question, long-debated, about the concept of hegemony. If the United States is a hegemon, why does a balance of power, composed of rivals that severely disagree with hegemonic domination, not form against the dominant United States? Building on the guidelines proposed by Wohlstetter (1964, 1968) and Elmore (1985) for the making of sound policy, namely, to see the world through the lens of the other so as to anticipate what others might conclude and do, the book critiques the very notion of hegemony. In this review, I argue from the perspective that the current conception of hegemony has neither historical nor theoretical justification (Doran 1991, pp. 117-121), and that many of the categories and examples assessed here bear witness to this reality. Joseph Nye (1990) distinguished between hegemony based on domination and control and a state carrying out a leadership role. Historically, as Doran (1971) argued, all military attempts at hegemonic domination in the central system failed; other members of the system rolled back these bids for hegemony forcefully, and the subsequent peace was neither designed nor governed (Ikenberry 1989; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Gaddis 2002) by any single state. Hegemony therefore involved attempts at centralized control, but never realized control. Instead, equilibrium among highly unequal states (Kissinger 2005) preserved the de-centralized nature of the international system (Vasquez 1993). Mearsheimer (2001) concurred that, as opposed to regions (Hurrell 2004) such as Eastern Europe under the Soviet Union or as opposed to the relationship between colonies and mother country (Mckeown 1983), hegemony in the central system never existed. The central international system is pluralistic, de-centralized, and subject to the rules of balance. Across long periods of history, the structure of the system changes as states follow their respective trajectories of relative power, reflecting their ability to carry out a variety of foreign policy roles. And at any point in time, states are located at highly unequal positions on these evolving power cycles. But a hegemon, a single all-powerful state, has never dominated and controlled; nor does it today; nor will it in the future. The United States is an ‘‘ordinary power’’ (Rosecrance 1976) like others, just more powerful, and, accordingly, more capable of providing certain leadership functions in the system. The choice of ‘‘global leadership’’ is far different from that of ‘‘global domination’’ (Brzezinski 2004). Failure to understand this reality has gotten the United States into the situation that is described in this book. The articles in Hegemony Constrained provide strong evidence in support of the claim that the reason a balance of power of disaffected states has not formed against the US is that, in other than defensive terms (Keohane 1984), hegemony does not exist except in the minds of a few theorists of international relations and influential advocates in policy circles. Not unexpectedly, other governments have discovered tactics to elude and to minimize the effect of such applications within US foreign policy. The excesses of application in the George W. Bush administration are the outcome of a mythology long in the making, extending from E.H. Carr’s extrapolation from British colonialism, and nurtured through American theorizing about the existence of a hegemon that dominates the system until a new rising state defeats and replaces the prior hegemon in a systems transforming war (Organski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981; Modelski and Thompson 1989; Kugler and Lemke 1996; Tammen, Kugler, Lemke, Stam, Abdol-Lahian, Alsharabati, Efird, and Organski 2000). In the aftermath of the collapse of bipolarity, the belief that unipolarity meant such hegemony began affecting foreign policy decision-making and rhetoric during the Clinton administration (when America was proclaimed ‘‘the biggest bulldog on the block’’). Quite in contrast is the argumentation of all prior administrations, going back to the Eisenhower administration, a time when America enjoyed greater relative power differentials (Pollins 1996) than those existing today. Yet, led by a groundswell of neo-conservative foreign policy thought (Krauthamer 1991; Mastanduno 1997; Wohlforth 1999; Kagan 2002; Barnett 2004), intellectual elites have so committed themselves to the hegemonic thesis that they have been ignorant of [sic] the consequences of their own speculation. Should they be surprised when the ‘‘hierarchy’’ of international relations turns out to be non-existent, or the capacity to control even very weak and divided polities is met with frustration? Americans have invented a mythology of hegemonic domination that corresponds so poorly to the position they actually find themselves in that they cannot comprehend the responses of other governments to their actions. Bobrow and his fellow writers show the dozens of ways that other governments find to evade, and to subvert, the proscriptions and fulminations emanating from Washington. By creating a mythology of hegemony rather than learning to work with the (properly conceived) balance of power, the United States has complicated its foreign policy and vastly raised the costs of its operation (Brown et al. 2000; Brzezinski 2004). By destroying a secular, albeit brutal, Sunni Arab center of power in Iraq, the United States must now contend with a far greater problem (Fearon 2006) of itself having to hold the country together and to balance a resurgent Iran. Bogged down in Iraq, it is unable to deter aggression against allies elsewhere such as Georgia and the Ukraine, or to stop the growing Russian diffusion [sic] of Latin America. By waving the flag of hegemony, the United States finds that very few other governments see the need to assist it, because hegemony is supposed to be self-financing, self-enforcing, and self-sufficient.

### Drones

Drones policy is shrouded in secrecy – debate is impossible because of the lack of transparency – instead of assessing the information selectively leaked by the government, focus should be on the production of knowledge behind policy.

Toth, ’13 [Kate Toth, London School of Economics, Dissertation; “REMOTE-CONTROLLED WAR: IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISTANCING OF STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE ON AMERICAN DEMOCRACY”; Apr 27, 2013; http://www.academia.edu/3125323/REMOTE-CONTROLLED\_WAR\_IMPLICATIONS\_OF\_THE\_DISTANCING\_OF\_STATE-SPONSORED\_VIOLENCE\_ON\_AMERICAN\_DEMOCRACY]

With regard to drones, what the public knows has been released through leaks to the press that were likely approved by the President (Engelhardt, 2012). Though the government now claims the right to assassinate Americans along with foreigners through the drone program, “informed public debate and judicial oversight” are impossible because “its drone program is so secret [the government] can't even admit to its existence” (Freed Wessler, 2012). That is, except via leaks that allow Obama to craft a politically advantageous narrative (Friedersdorf, 2012a). Meanwhile, the use of drones has exploded domestically, and again, “citizens lack a basic right to know who is operating the drones circling their houses, what information is being collected and how it will be used” (ABC News, 2012). The Bush administration politicized science (Beck, 1992) by notoriously editing reports on climate change and pressuring scientists (Coglianese, 2009). This is instructive for the current debate as it exhibits that one cannot simply assess the information released, but examine this knowledge within a political context, harking back to Foucault’s (1997) production of knowledge. Writing about the covert drone strikes, Friedersdorf (2012b) in The Atlantic asked, “in what sense would we be living in a representative democracy if neither the bulk of Congress nor the people” are told about the strikes? One of the lingering questions raised from this debate is, how different is it if we were told the bare minimum of facts via leaks, so still preventing effective debate, versus being told nothing at all? When President Obama took office, in the memo outlining his “Transparency and Open Government” initiative, it was written that transparency will “ensure the public trust and establish a system of transparency, public participation, and collaboration” and that this transparency will “strengthen our democracy” (White House, 2009). This is what Obama believes transparency has the power to achieve, and it falls in line with the access to information that Diamond and Morlino (2004) highlight as key to accountability in democracy. President Obama’s track record is, perhaps, an example of not striking the right balance between what, and how much, to release. However, given that many of the steps he has taken, both in terms of transparency of existing programs and secrecy regarding proliferation of new programs such as drones, it does not seem likely that this is unintentional. Transparency relies on a strong civil society to use the information effectively, or press for it to be released (Etzioni, 2010); perhaps this lack of accountability is also indicative of the weakness of current American civil society and media.

Al Qaeda does not exist as a unique entity – it is an umbrella term for anyone the US considers as an enemy.

Corrigan 13 (Edward Corrigan, human rights and international lawyer from Ontario, to shed more light on the issue of the US and al-Qaeda interrelations., <http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/08/07/317696/alqaeda-threat-ploy-to-silence-americans/>)

What follows is an approximate transcription of the interview. Press TV: Now, it seems, from the statement of the White House press secretary, that anybody whose ideology is against the US or is perceived as a threat, is categorically regarded as al-Qaeda. Corrigan: That is a correct observation, but the other issue is that it really is a phantom; something that does not exist. Al-Qaeda means the database. There is no organization, there is no hierarchy and there is no membership card, there is no oath. So al-Qaeda as an organization, in a conventional sense, does not exist but anybody that the Americans have a grievance with or somebody who has a grievance with the United States is all put under this umbrella and they say this is al-Qaeda or its affiliates, okay? At the very best, it is a very, very loose, nebulous organization; not organization but maybe some contacts between Islamic groups and groups that have national grievances against the United States for some reason or another. But the anger that has been expressed in existence with the massive killing by the drone strikes of innocent civilians, the massive intervention into internal affairs of other countries and blowing up people without, really, a just cause;..., just under the mere premise that we suspect that they may be opposed to us, which is the worst of the Nazis and the Stalinists and any other sort of totalitarian country would do just to get away with people that they want to kill, or even people they just think may be a threat. But thinking somebody is a threat and somebody being an actual threat is totally different and of course especially when you have the United States deciding in a unilateral manner who is a threat and everybody, of course if they kill, happens to be a threat and a few civilians, they say, are collateral damage, but there is massive killings of innocent civilians. But this whole thing is really a pretext; I agree with, I guess, one of your previous speakers where they said this is just a pretext used to support the NSA program. Right now there is a massive effort on the part of the Congress to curtail the NSA. Germany for example has cut off its agreement with the United States and Britain over the spying scandal. You earlier addressed the fact that a number of South American countries; Bolivians and others have also strongly protested this, ok? But the anger to the United States is because of their drone program; is because of this massive spying, it is because of killing of the civilians, intervention into other countries rights and the whole thing because of the political pressure to curtail the NSA. It is miraculous, all of a sudden a threat comes up, you know, the al-Qaeda is on the run, we are destroying it, but all of a sudden they close all of the embassies. This is really a pretext used to try to silence the mounting opposition to the United States to these massive illegal spying programs.

### War on Poverty

Aff accesses critical sequencing question – The War Metaphor justified the war on poverty.

Elkins, ‘10 [Jeremy Elkins, Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley. Professor in Political Science at Bryn Mawr College. He has taught at the University of California, Berkeley and the University of California, Santa Cruz, where he served as chair of the Legal Studies Program; “The Model of War”, 2010; Political Theory 38(2)]

The United States emerged from World War II as the dominant military power in the world, and soon established itself as the leader in the western cold war alliance. It is not surprising that at such a moment, the language of war would be, as it were, turned inward and invoked as a metaphor for a national commitment to solving domestic problems. Nor is it surprising that this language should be particularly favored by the executive, whose authority in wartime is at its greatest. After the American role in liberating Europe and the assertion of American power in Korea, Latin America, Indochina, and elsewhere, it is easy enough to understand why President Johnson, in seeking a bold policy initiative to help define his presidency in the wake of the Kennedy assassination and in attempting (as he later put it) to “rally the nation, to sound a call to arms that would stir people in the government, in private industry, and on the campuses to lend their talents to a massive effort to eliminate the evil”5 of American poverty, would turn to the language of war. It is similarly understandable why those who desired increased funding for cancer research and who sought to persuade President Nixon that with an all-out effort, a cure for cancer was within sight,6 might adopt that language, and why the President and Congress would do so in turn; for even as the Vietnam war dragged on with no clear victory in sight, and even as that war came to divide the nation, the idea of war remained closely associated with that of a unified and centrally organized national effort and with the kind of unconditional victory that the United States had demanded and helped to secure against the Axis powers.

Embrace instability of argumentation – a turn to openness is the most meaningful decision – star this card.

Corder, ‘85 [Jim W. Corder is Professor of English at Texas Christian University. In 1975 he received the NCTE's Braddock Prize. He has published articles on rhetoric in various journals and has written several textbooks on writing.; “Argument as Emergence, Rhetoric as Love”; Rhetoric Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Sep., 1985); Taylor & Francis]

d. We arguers can learn the lessons that rhetoric itself wants to teach us. By its nature, invention asks us to open ourselves to the richness of creation, to plumb its depths, search its expanses, and track its chronologies. But the moment we speak (or write), we are no longer open; we have chosen, whether deliberately or not, and so have closed ourselves off from some possibilities. Invention wants openness; structure and style demand closure. We are asked to be perpetually open and always closing. If we stay open, we cannot speak or act; if we are [sic] closed, we have succumbed to dogma and rigidity. Each utterance may deplete the inventive possibilities if a speaker falls into arro- gance, ignorance, or dogma. But each utterance, if the speaker having spoken opens again, may also nurture and replenish the speaker's inventive world and enable him or her to reach out around the other. Beyond any speaker's bound inventive world lies another: there lie the riches of creation, the great, un- bounded possible universe of invention. All time is there, past, present, and future. The natural and the supernatural are there. All creation is there, ground and source for invention. The knowledge we have is formed out of the plenti- tude of creation, which is all before us, but must be sought again and again through the cycling process of rhetoric, closing to speak, opening again to invent again. In an unlimited universe of meaning, we can never foreclose on interpretation and argument. Invention is a name for a great miracle-the attempt to unbind time, to loosen the capacities of time and space into our speaking. This copiousness is eternally there, a plentitude for all. Piaget remarked that the more an infant senses [sic], the more he or she wants to sense the world [sic]. Just this is what the cycling of rhetoric offers us: opening to invention, closing to speak, opening again to a richer invention. Utterances may thus be elevated, may grow to hold both arguer and other.

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Our interpretations are beneficial for understanding perspectives of debate education as fluid – utilizing metaphor as a starting point solves all their offense.

O’Donnell, ‘4 [Timothy M. O’Donnell, Director of Debate, University of Mary Washington; “And the Twain Shall Meet: Affirmative Framework Choice and the Future of Debate”; Debater’s Research Guide, 2004; http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/ DRGArticles/Framework%20article%20for%20the%20DRG%20final2.doc]

In a world where proponents for any one of the varied questions are equally strident in staking out their views about what the debate ought to be about, agreement seems to be impossible. To be sure, there is value in each of these views. Public policy is important. The political consequences of policies are important. The language used in constructing policies is important. The presentational aspects of policy are important. The epistemological, ontological, and ethical underpinnings of policies are important. And so on. What are we to do then in situations where advocates on all sides make more or less equally compelling claims? As an educator, I am interested in having the students that I work with ask and answer all of these questions at one time or another. As a coach, I am interested in having them have a predictable set of arguments to prepare for. Thus, the question for me is, how can we have a game in which they have such an opportunity? The argument of this essay seeks to chart a partial answer to this question. It involves staking out a compromise position that recognizes that there is value in a wide variety of perspectives and that all deserve an equal opportunity to be represented in competitive debates. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a framework consists of “a set of standards, beliefs, or assumptions” that govern behavior. When we speak of frameworks in competitive academic debate we are talking about the set of standards, beliefs, or assumptions that generate the question that the judge ought to answer at the end of the debate. Given that there is no agreement among participants about which standards, beliefs, or assumptions ought to be universally accepted, it seems that we will never be able to arrive at an agreeable normative assumption about what the question ought to be. So the issue before us is how we preserve community while agreeing to disagree about the question in a way that recognizes that there is richness in answering many different questions that would not otherwise exist if we all adhered to a “rule” which stated that there is one and only one question to be answered. More importantly, how do we stop talking past each other so that we can have a genuine conversation about the substantive merits of any one question? The answer, I believe, resides deep in the rhetorical tradition in the often overlooked notion of stasis. Although the concept can be traced to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, it was later expanded by Hermagoras whose thinking has come down to us through the Roman rhetoricians Cicero and Quintillian. Stasis is a Greek word meaning to “stand still.” It has generally been considered by argumentation scholars to be the point of clash where two opposing sides meet in argument. Stasis recognizes the fact that interlocutors engaged in a conversation, discussion, or debate need to have some level of expectation regarding what the focus of their encounter ought to be. To reach stasis, participants need to arrive at a decision about what the issue is prior to the start of their conversation. Put another way, they need to mutually acknowledge the point about which they disagree. What happens when participants fail to reach agreement about what it is that they are arguing about? They talk past each other with little or no awareness of what the other is saying. The oft used cliché of two ships passing in the night, where both are in the dark about what the other is doing and neither stands still long enough to call out to the other, is the image most commonly used to describe what happens when participants in an argument fail to achieve stasis. In such situations, genuine engagement is not possible because participants have not reached agreement about what is in dispute. For example, when one advocate says that the United States should increase international involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq and their opponent replies that the United States should abandon its policy of preemptive military engagement, they are talking past each other. When such a situation prevails, it is hard to see how a productive conversation can ensue. I do not mean to suggest that dialogic engagement always unfolds along an ideal plain where participants always can or even ought to agree on a mutual starting point. The reality is that many do not. In fact, refusing to acknowledge an adversary’s starting point is itself a powerful strategic move. However, it must be acknowledged that when such situations arise, and participants cannot agree on the issue about which they disagree, the chances that their exchange will result in a productive outcome are diminished significantly. In an enterprise like academic debate, where the goals of the encounter are cast along both educational and competitive lines, the need to reach accommodation on the starting point is urgent. This is especially the case when time is limited and there is no possibility of extending the clock. The sooner such agreement is achieved, the better. Stasis helps us understand that we stand to lose a great deal when we refuse a genuine starting point. How can stasis inform the issue before us regarding contemporary debate practice? Whether we recognize it or not, it already has. The idea that the affirmative begins the debate by using the resolution as a starting point for their opening speech act is nearly universally accepted by all members of the debate community. This is born out by the fact that affirmative teams that have ignored the resolution altogether have not gotten very far. Even teams that use the resolution as a metaphorical condensation or that “affirm the resolution as such” use the resolution as their starting point. The significance of this insight warrants repeating. Despite the numerous differences about what types of arguments ought to have a place in competitive debate we all seemingly agree on at least one point – the vital necessity of a starting point. This common starting point, or topic, is what separates debate from other forms of communication and gives the exchange a directed focus.

### ---Metaphor Key to Topic

War powers education is bankrupt without investigation of metaphor –

Lakoff and Frisch, ‘6 [George Lakoff, Richard and Rhoda Goldman Distinguished Professor of Cognitive Science and Linguistics at the University of California at Berkeley; Evan Frisch, Rockridge Institute’s technology Strategist; “Five Years After 9/11: Drop the War Metaphor” September 11, 2006 http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0911-20.htm]

Language matters, because it can determine how we think and act. For a few hours after the towers fell on 9/11, administration spokesmen referred to the event as a "crime." Indeed, Colin Powell argued within the administration that it be treated as a crime. This would have involved international crime-fighting techniques: checking banks accounts, wire-tapping, recruiting spies and informants, engaging in diplomacy, cooperating with intelligence agencies in other governments, and if necessary, engaging in limited "police actions" with military force. Indeed, such methods have been the most successful so far in dealing with terrorism. But the crime frame did not prevail in the Bush administration. Instead, a war metaphor was chosen: the "War on Terror." Literal �not metaphorical � wars are conducted against armies of other nations. They end when the armies are defeated militarily and a peace treaty is signed. Terror is an emotional state. It is in us. It is not an army. And you can't defeat it militarily and you can't sign a peace treaty with it. The war metaphor was chosen for political reasons. First and foremost, it was chosen for the domestic political reasons. The war metaphor defined war as the only way to defend the nation. From within the war metaphor, being against war as a response was to be unpatriotic, to be against defending the nation. The war metaphor put progressives on the defensive. Once the war metaphor took hold, any refusal to grant the president full authority to conduct the war would open progressives in Congress to the charge of being unpatriotic, unwilling to defend America, defeatist. And once the military went into battle, the war metaphor created a new reality that reinforced the metaphor. Once adopted, the war metaphor allowed the president to assume war powers, which made him politically immune from serious criticism and gave him extraordinary domestic power to carry the agenda of the radical right: Power to shift money and resources away from social needs and to the military and related industries. Power to override environmental safeguards on the grounds of military need. Power to set up a domestic surveillance system to spy on our citizens and to intimidate political enemies. Power over political discussion, since war trumps all other topics. In short, power to reshape America to the vision of the radical right � with no end date. In addition, the war metaphor was used as justification for the invasion of Iraq, which Bush had planned for since his first week in office. Frank Luntz, the right-wing language expert, recommended referring to the Iraq war as part of the "War on Terror" � even when it was known that Saddam Hussein had nothing to do with 9/11 and indeed saw Osama bin Laden as an enemy. Fox News used "War on Terror" as a headline when showing film clips from Iraq. Remember "Weapons of Mass Destruction?" They were invented by the Bush administration to strike terror into the hearts of Americans and to justify the invasion. Remember that the Iraq War was advocated before 9/11 and promoted as early as 1997 by the members of the Project for the New American Century, who later came to dominate in the Bush administration. Why? The right-wing strategy was to use the American military to achieve economic and strategic goals in the Middle East: to gain control of the second largest oil reserve in the world; to place military bases right in the heart of the Middle East for the sake of economic and political intimidation; to open up Middle East markets and economic opportunities for American corporations; and to place American culture and a controllable government in the heart of the Middle East. The justification was 9/11 � to identify the Iraq invasion as part of the "War on Terror" and claim that it is necessary in order to protect America and spread democracy.

# 1AR

The war on poverty externalizes the poor and causes violent exclusion – this card is justified because of the changing of the frame of the net benefit.

Elkins, ‘10 [Jeremy Elkins, Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley. Professor in Political Science at Bryn Mawr College. He has taught at the University of California, Berkeley and the University of California, Santa Cruz, where he served as chair of the Legal Studies Program; “The Model of War”, 2010; Political Theory 38(2)]

As with cancer, a true national commitment to eradicating poverty would have required turning very deeply inwards and confronting (as many of the most ardent antipoverty warriors advocated) a host of conditions and policies that contributed to the perpetuation of poverty. Yet despite some initial willingness to confront the deeper causes of poverty, Johnson was acutely sensitive to the resistance of many in the electorate to the idea that the body politic needed to be healed and to those segments of the middle class whose interests would be threatened by reform. As the war on poverty took shape, Johnson thus insisted that the funding for antipoverty programs not threaten middle-class tax cuts (which effectively eliminated most proposals for job creation programs), backed off on plans to tie poverty programs to racial integration in housing when this was opposed by Southerners and some Northern big city mayors, pressed to revise the centerpiece Community Action Program when it threatened local elites and bureaucracies, and refused to take on a long list of other structural contributors to poverty.24 None of this was, needless to say, a result of the adoption of war language. But that language helped to justify the limited scope of the antipoverty program by reinforcing the notion that poverty was not so much a condition of the body politic as one lying outside of it, and that, therefore, as one antipoverty warrior put it, whatever the war on poverty did was a supererogatory effort by “us” for “them,” a form of noblesse oblige by the nation for others who have been struck by a tragic condition.25 And while, ironically, the image of the poor as living outside of the nation was initially employed by members of the administration in depicting the war on poverty as a kind of economic irredentist movement to extend the national “prosperity . . . [to] those who have been kept outside.”26 The representation, however, of the problem of poverty as also essentially “outside” of the nation meant that the poor had no special claim on the nation; for while they were in the body politic, they were not quite of it. This tendency to externalize not only poverty as an abstraction, but along with it the poor took several other forms as well. In one, the true body politic was identified as a certain kind of cultural community in relation to which the poor were outsiders, living, like gypsies, in a “culture of poverty” on the outskirts of the nation. And for many whites, the conception of the poor as a kind of domestic alien was further reinforced when the focus of the war shifted from Appalachian poverty to black ghetto poverty, and all the more so when the administration responded to ghetto unrest by redirecting the war on poverty, to a significant degree, as a means of pacifying the ghettoes. That transformation—from, as it were, a “hot war” on poverty to a cold war of containment—reached its limiting point in the Nixon administration, which dropped talk of a war on poverty entirely and focused on keeping the ghettos under control. But the termination of the war on poverty was in this respect a progression—by no means, of course, a necessary one—of a tendency encouraged by the idea that poverty itself was not part of the fabric of the nation but an alien force. The “war on poverty,” like the “war on cancer,” thus contained an internal tension: the more “unconditional,” the more like a full-scale war, the more it would have to focus on domestically produced causes. Yet the language of war came to represent the problem as though it were constitutionally, essentially, external to the real nation: an army that had invaded the national body rather than a condition that was the product of it.

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In such situations, genuine engagement is not possible because participants have not reached agreement about what is in dispute. For example, when one advocate says that the United States should increase international involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq and their opponent replies that the United States should abandon its policy of preemptive military engagement, they are talking past each other. When such a situation prevails, it is hard to see how a productive conversation can ensue. I do not mean to suggest that dialogic engagement always unfolds along an ideal plain where participants always can or even ought to agree on a mutual starting point. The reality is that many do not. In fact, refusing to acknowledge an adversary’s starting point is itself a powerful strategic move. However, it must be acknowledged that when such situations arise, and participants cannot agree on the issue about which they disagree, the chances that their exchange will result in a productive outcome are diminished significantly. In an enterprise like academic debate, where the goals of the encounter are cast along both educational and competitive lines, the need to reach accommodation on the starting point is urgent. This is especially the case when time is limited and there is no possibility of extending the clock. The sooner such agreement is achieved, the better. Stasis helps us understand that we stand to lose a great deal when we refuse a genuine starting point. How can stasis inform the issue before us regarding contemporary debate practice? Whether we recognize it or not, it already has. The idea that the affirmative begins the debate by using the resolution as a starting point for their opening speech act is nearly universally accepted by all members of the debate community. This is born out by the fact that affirmative teams that have ignored the resolution altogether have not gotten very far. Even teams that use the resolution as a metaphorical condensation or that “affirm the resolution as such” use the resolution as their starting point. The significance of this insight warrants repeating. Despite the numerous differences about what types of arguments ought to have a place in competitive debate we all seemingly agree on at least one point – the vital necessity of a starting point. This common starting point, or topic, is what separates debate from other forms of communication and gives the exchange a directed focus.